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In most countries the state owns the water resources and the hydraulic infrastruc-
ture, and public officials decide who gets the water, how it is to be used, and how
much will be charged for it. But costly inefficiencies in the supply and use of water
support a shift from government provision to a market-based approach that is more
effective and less wasteful
Markets can allow rapid changes in allocation in response to changing demands
for water and can stimulate investment and employment as investors are assured of
access to secure supplies of water. Because of water's unique characteristics, such
markets do not work everywhere; nor do they resolve all water-related issues. By
designing appropriate water laws and regulations and by strengthening private and
public institutions to administer them, formal water markets can effectively address
rising demands for groundwater and for water found in rivers, lakes, and canals.
Lessons from Chiles experience demonstrate that formal water markets can improve
the economic efficiency of water use and stimulate investment.
In many developing countries, governments consider water to be too precious a
resource or too difficult a commodity to be left to the market. Decisions about
who gets water, at what price, and for what use have thus been entrusted to
public officials. Although the state retains ownership of diis asset, it typically
endows private and public entities, such as farmers, industrial users, and power
and water companies, with the right to use surface water .or groundwater for a
particular purpose. These rights are defined in a variety of ways and have been
written into law or have evolved dirough custom (Sampath 1992). The alloca-
tion of water rights is typically the responsibility of die government, as is the
construction, ownership, and operation of die infrastructure such as dams, res-
ervoirs, and canals. In some countries diat government even installs and oper-
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ates wells. Recently many countries have transferred operations and manage-
ment responsibility to user associations; enforcement is the responsibility of
public authorities or water user associations—or both. User associations are
typically informal entities that play a role in distributing the water of a canal or
river. In some countries, however, such as Chile, Mexico, and Peru, user asso-
ciations are legally recognized bodies that set and collect fees for operating and
maintaining the hydraulic infrastructure. Water companies and industries may
belong to user associations, but most associations are made up primarily of
farmers.
Publicly administered systems of water rights have all too often resulted in
inefficiencies in the use and supply of water. Despite its growing scarcity and
increasingly costly hydraulic infrastructure, water is often used wastefully. This
is especially true in agriculture, which accounts for 70 percent of water use
worldwide, compared with only 8 percent used for household consumption. It
is not unusual in arid areas to find cities rationing water even as neighboring
farmers grow low-value, water-intensive crops using inefficient irrigation tech-
nologies. Although governments normally reserve the right to reallocate water
toward more desirable uses, in practice they have found it difficult to do so.
Even in the face of rapidly changing demands for water, attempts to shift sup-
plies from agricultural users to domestic urban consumers have often generated
conflicts and fomented social disruption.
Moreover, government control has not been effective at ensuring that the
poor have access to water. In many cities in developing countries, the poorest
are not served by piped municipal water and must resort to buying water from
private vendors at prices that are several multiples of those paid by better-off
residents. And farmers who are politically influential manage to get easier ac-
cess to water rights, which are obtained without charge and for whose use farm-
ers typically pay only a nominal fee. Because farmers are unable to sell any
surplus water, there is little incentive to conserve water by better soil or water
management or by growing less water-intensive crops.
Nor has government control over water been effective at maintaining water
or soil quality or protecting ecosystems in most developing countries. The dis-
charge of municipal and industrial wastes, the runoff of agricultural chemicals,
and poor land-use practices in agriculture, mining, and forestry have led to
widespread degradation of land and water resources. Water-borne diseases cause
an estimated three million deaths annually and render sick a billion more. In
addition, poorly designed public irrigation projects and insufficient incentives
for water conservation have resulted in extensive soil salinization (a process in
which salts impregnate soils, making it unsuitable for agriculture) and contrib-
uted to ecological disasters in many countries (World Bank 1993). In many
countries water from underground aquifers is pumped out at unsustainable
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levels, threatening the livelihood of many agricultural and nonagricultural us-
ers, as well as seriously damaging ecosystems.
A system of publicly allocated water rights makes the private sector reluctant
to invest in hydraulic infrastructure—or in activities whose operation requires
large quantities of water. If the water in a reservoir built with private funds can
be commandeered by the government to meet social or political objectives,
investors will have litde incentive to provide such infrastructure. If water can
be reallocated from agricultural to urban users when shortages occur, investors
are unlikely.to invest in agriculture.
At the same time, public investment in hydraulic infrastructure has often
been a losing proposition. There is no dearth of taxpayer-financed dams that
were ill-conceived and, because of budgetary difficulties, long delays, and cost-
overruns, cost far more than their eventual benefits were worth. Similarly, ef-
forts to construct and operate public wells have also been unsuccessful. In many
countries sizable shares of the public infrastructure budget have gone toward
expensive hydraulic projects with low or negative economic rates of return
(Holden and Thobani 1995). Despite high construction costs, many of these
projects have not been adequately operated or maintained, leaving users, the
bulk of whom are farmers, without a reliable supply of water and iinwilling to
pay higher water charges (Ostrom 1992).
The future looks bleak. Demand for water is rising, and because countries
have already exploited the less expensive sources of supply, the cost of develop-
ing new supplies has increased sharply. Furthermore, as governments face in-
creasing fiscal pressures, they are no longer willing to spend vast public re-
sources to build new dams and wells or even to operate and maintain existing
hydraulic infrastructure.
Market-Based Instruments for Water Allocation
Recent approaches to meet the growing demand for water have focused on
voluntary mechanisms to conserve water and reallocate it among competing
uses rather than on developing new sources of supply. At the same time, gov-
ernments are seeking alternative ways to finance the operation and manage-
ment of existing infrastructure and the construction of new infrastructure. These
alternative approaches may be divided into three categories: pricing policies,
informal water markets, and formal water markets.
Pricing Policies
By raising the user price of water to reflect its true scarcity, or opportunity cost
(that is, the price the marginal user is willing to pay), authorities hope to induce
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users to conserve water, making it possible to divert supplies to higher value
uses (World Bank 1993).1 In principle, if irrigation water near a city could be
priced at what a water company would be willing to pay for the crude water
(adjusting for conveyance costs), some farmers would give up farming, and
others would switch to more efficient irrigation or grow less water-intensive
crops. The higher charges would free up water that could be transferred to die
water company for treatment and subsequent sale. They would also generate
fiscal resources that could be used to improve die performance and mainte-
nance of die existing infrastructure or to invest in new infrastructure.
Serious practical and political problems, however, have prevented any gov-
ernment from pricing water at its opportunity cost. Even if governments could
find an inexpensive way to measure and monitor water flow, measuring the
opportunity cost of water is difficult because it varies according to location,
reliability, season, use, and water quality. Reliable and high quality ground-
water close to a city that is rationing water will have a high opportunity cost
(even after adjusting for pumping charges), while more polluted water along a
more distant river with a variable flow will have a low opportunity cost. Even
this difference will vary according to the year and season. In a year with average
precipitation, die opportunity cost of water will be far lower dian it is in a
drought year, just as it will be lower in die rainy season than it is in die dry
season. Water used for agriculture or mining will have a much higher opportu-
nity cost than water that is used for hydropower generation and is returned to
the river in roughly die same quantity and quality. But if water for hydropower
is stored during periods when it is needed for odier activities such as agricul-
ture, its opportunity cost could be significant.
The political problems are even more intractable. It is politically difficult to
charge a farmer for water from a river that serves a town (and therefore has a
high opportunity cost) a higher price dian a farmer using water from a river
diat is not near a town. Similarly, it is difficult to charge profitable hydropower
companies less than poor farmers. Strong farmer lobbies typically pressure poli-
ticians to keep water charges well below their opportunity cost.
Another problem in pricing irrigation water at its opportunity cost is diat the
price of land already embodies the price of water rights. In areas of low rainfall,
irrigated land may sell for ten times the price of unirrigated land, reflecting the
expectation that the owner of irrigated land will receive water at a low charge. If
charges are later raised to reflect the opportunity cost of water, this land will be
valued the same as unirrigated land, resulting in an effective expropriation of
the farmer's assets. Aldiough government actions frequendy alter die value of
private assets, the sheer magnitude of asset expropriation implied, the numbers
of people affected, and the socially disruptive aspects (in agricultural unem-
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ploymcnt) of such a policy make it highly unlikely that opportunity cost pric-
ing can be introduced within a reasonable time frame.
A unique problem affecting water pricing involves "return flows." When a
farmer waters crops, only part of the water is absorbed by the plant. Depending
on the efficiency of irrigation, a significant share of the water—the return flow—
will seep underground. This water may enter an underground aquifer and be
pumped up by another user, or it may even rejoin the river and be diverted into
a canal. If water were priced volumetrically, according to what was received
radier than what was actually consumed, farmers using inefficient irrigation'
(thereby inadvertendy helping out downstream users) would pay too high a
price. These pricing difficulties do not mean that water should be provided at
no charge, but they do suggest diat setting water prices administratively to en-
sure rational use will be difficult in practice and that the consequences could
well be socially and politically disruptive.
Informal Water Markets
Where governments have failed to respond to rapidly changing demands for
water, local (spot) water markets have emerged in several water-scarce coun-
tries. Although such informal markets, in which users contract for water on
their own, are technically illegal, governments usually turn a blind eye to diem,
perhaps because they manage to reallocate water quickly and voluntarily. In a
typical transaction, a farmer sells a specified volume of his surplus groundwater
or surface water for a season or a specified period to a neighboring farmer. Or
several farmers collectively sell some of their water to a nearby town.2
In diis way water is reallocated to more valuable uses widiout penalizing
existing holders of water rights. At die same rime die ability to sell provides an
incentive for conserving water and using it more rationally. Such informal mar-
kets are widespread in South Asia (Pakistan Water and Power Development
Authority 1990; Shah 1991; Saledi 1996). The audior found them to have
been widespread in Mexico even before the introduction of formal tradable
water rights. (See also Meinzen-Dick 1996, who found that informal water
markets in Soudi Asia were able to increase poor farmers' access to water).
In some cases these trades have not performed well and have resulted in an
economically inefficient allocation of water. In parts of South Asia, wealdiier
farmers widi deep wells charge neighboring smaller farmers a high "monopoly"
price for water. As a result crop output is lower than it would be if die water
were priced at its opportunity cost—and income inequality is exacerbated. The
opportunity to sell such a valuable resource also increases exploitation of ground-
water, which can deplete underground aquifers (Saleth 1996). Moreover, be-
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cause such transactions are illegal, it is difficult to enforce adherence to the
entidement (water right) and protect the aquifers.
A further complication is that diese illegal markets may allow upstream users
to sell more than they actually consume (because they may sell the return flow
component of dieir water right), diereby infringing upon the rights of diird
parties. In addition die buyer lacks die security of an enforceable contract. Trades
are therefore limited to spot sales or to sales for a single season, often between
neighbors; longer-term trades are nonexistent, depriving potential investors or
water companies secure long-term access to water. Finally, compared widi
opportunity-cost pricing, informal markets do not generate fiscal revenues,
nor do they provide sufficient incentives or means for die creation of new
infrastructure.
Formal Water Markets
Several governments have established legal tradable water rights in an attempt
to retain and extend die advantages of informal water markets while reducing
some of the negative costs stemming from dieir illegal status. The potential to
sell water rights makes them more valuable and provides an incentive for con-
serving water and reallocating it to higher-value uses. In diis sense, die outcome
is similar to diat under opportunity-cost pricing. Tradable water rights also
allow leasing of water (for a season, say) and spot sales; in fact, diey facilitate
such transactions. Finally, by allocating initial water rights, widiout charge, to
existing users or holders of water rights, tradable water rights can circumvent
die political problems associated with raising water prices and setting nonuni-
form charges. Governments can monitor operations and more effectively en-
force laws and regulations aimed at preventing the abuse of monopoly power,
at ensuring that sales do not negatively affect die water available to third parties
(that is, at addressing the problems of return flow), and at protecting die
environment.
Chile and Mexico are die only countries diat have established formal re-
gimes of tradable water rights at the national level, but many of the western
states of die United States and some states in Australia have such systems (see
Rosegrant and Gazmuri 1995 and Pigram and others 1993 for descriptions of
die California and Australian systems, respectively.) There are also pockets of
semiformal water markets in some countries, where well-regulated water mar-
kets have existed for more dian a hundred years, even though diey are not
consistent widi national and state water laws (see Kemper 1996). In Australia
and die United States, concerns about die environment and protecting diird
parties have led to many restrictions on water trading diat have added to die
cost of transactions—or blocked potentially beneficial trades. For example, water
1 • • The World Bank Raetnb Observer, voL 12, na. 2 (August 1997)
markets in some areas of the United States, such as Colorado and New Mexico,
which have few restrictions on trading, have functioned quite well for more
than a century, but restrictions on trading have limited the usefulness of the
water markets in California. As a result, farmers in California continue to grow
low-value, water-intensive crops even when neighboring cities face water short-
ages and rationing. The Chilean and Mexican water market regimes are prob-
ably better models for developing countries facing water shortages.
CHILE. Under Chile's 1981 water code, the state grants existing water users
property rights to bodi surface water and groundwater widiout charge.3 These
rights are separate from the land and, except for a few restrictions, owners may
sell them to anyone for any purpose at negotiated prices. These water rights
may also be leased, used as collateral, and inherited. Interested parties may pe-
tition to obtain new and unallocated water rights. If others are interested in the
same rights, they will be sold at auction; if not, the petitioner will receive the
rights without charge.
Rights are obtained by being recorded in a public registry as either consump-
tive or nonconsumptive, permanent or temporary (contingent). Nonconsump-
tive rights oblige the holder to return the same volume of water to a specific
location (this right is useful mainly for hydropower generation). Temporary
rights can be exercised only if all permanent rights have been met (useful when
storage capacity exists). The rights are defined volumetrically (either in liters
per second or in cubic meters), but revert to proportional rights (share of the
streamflow or of the volume in a reservoir) if the available water does not per-
mit all volumetric rights to be honored. This last feature is particularly impor-
tant in Chile because few rivers have dams or reservoirs for storage.
Water users' associations are responsible for monitoring, distributing, and
enforcing water rights at the level of the river basin, primary canal, and second-
ary or tertiary canal. They own and operate die bulk of the hydraulic infrastruc-
ture and set water tariffs. The government continues to manage the headworks
for some large dams and reservoirs and to charge users for these services.
MEXICO. Under Mexico's 1992 water law, users may convert their existing
nontradable water rights to more secure long-term concessions (with a typical
maturity of diirty years). These concessions may be leased or sold as long as die
sale does not negatively affect the water rights of other users. For nonagricul-
tural users, farmer associations, and groundwater users, the rights are recorded
in a public registry and are defined volumetrically. Because any deficits or sur-
pluses are allocated proportionately, however, the rights are effectively propor-
tional. For individual farmers using surface water, the rights are defined only in
terms of area to be irrigated and are registered by the water users association.
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Users may forfeit their rights if the water is not used efficiently or if it has not
been used for three years. Thus, in principle, these rights are less secure than
those in Chile. But Mexico's National Water Commission does not specify
what constitutes inefficient water use, and die author found no evidence of
users having forfeited their rights for this reason. Although the rights cover a
fixed period, the water commission plans to renew the concessions for only a
nominal administrative charge. Therefore, in effect, the rights are longer-term
and more secure than diey appear.
Why Establish Tradable Water Rights?
Tradable rights offer water owners an incentive to sell or lease part or all of their
holdings to those who have higher-value uses for it. Tradable rights give buyers
of water a strong incentive to conserve water to keep their costs to a minimum.
Farmers who are considering purchasing new rights are thus more likely to use
efficient irrigation techniques, and water companies are more likely to try to
reduce water losses.
Such voluntary and flexible transfers that divert water to more productive
uses have indeed occurred in die water-scarce areas of Mexico and Chile. In
Mexico the transfers benefited some small farmers whose unprofitable fanning
activities had led to the accumulation of unsustainable debt. In the past they
would have resorted eidier to selling their land and water rights, which would
have forced them to leave the land, or to illegally selling their water rights at a
lower price. Because they can sell the rights legally, however, and thereby ob-
tain a better price, they have been able to use the proceeds to pay off dieir
debts. Some have even been employed by the farmers that bought the water
rights. Similarly, firms that formerly resorted to extracting groundwater ille-
gally have begun buying groundwater rights legally, thereby reducing the prob-
lem of aquifer depletion while obtaining secure water rights.
In Chile farmers sold or leased their surplus water rights to more efficient
neighboring farmers, industrial users, or water companies. The sales and leases
have allowed some water companies and industrial users to obtain reliable ac-
cess to water without expensive infrastructure investment. The results, accord-
ing to one study (Hearne and Easter 1997), have been large gains to society.
For example, the city of La Serena was able to purchase 28 percent of its water
rights from neighboring farmers, allowing the government to postpone the con-
struction of a proposed dam. Similarly, the city of Arica, in die arid north, has
been able to meet the needs of urban residents by leasing groundwater from
farmers. Such measures have contributed to Chile's success in providing water
to virtually all urban residents.
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Changes in the structure of water markets create new opportunities for con-
serving water. When Santiago's municipal water company, EMOS, was notified
that it could no longer receive new water rights widiout charge, die company
initially sought to purchase additional water rights. When potential sellers de-
manded too high a price, EMOS decided instead to rehabilitate its aging pipe
structure to reduce water leakages. Similarly, farmers who must pay for water
rights to expand production have an additional reason, to install efficient irriga-
tion, to use better soil management techniques, or to grow less water-intensive
crops. Some Chilean farmers have even used options contracts as a way to avoid
buying water diat diey might not need. The option allows a farmer (who needs
to ensure diat his trees, say, do not die if diere is a drought) to pay a neighbor-
ing farmer growing an annual crop for the option of buying water at a
prencgotiated price in case of a drought.
The conservation occurred even though water charges were not raised. In
fact, several water users' associations in Chile reported diat water charges fell
after die new water law was passed in 1981. Even before the introduction of die
current law, die government was charging users die full cost of system opera-
tions and maintenance, which was handled by public authorities. Under die
new legislation, diose who hold water rights are responsible for setting water
tariffs as well as for operating and maintaining die infrastructure. Because
diey have been able to provide diese services at a lower cost, water tariffs have
declined.
The situation was different in Mexico, however, where water prices were so
low diat government subsidies for operating die infrastructure amounted to
0.5 percent of gross domestic product. Just before tradable water rights were
introduced, Mexico began to move toward charging full recovery of service
costs and to turn over operational responsibility to users. Aldiough costs for
operations and management fell, die savings were not enough to compensate
for die reduction in subsidies, so water users in Mexico are generally paying
higher water tariffs.
The Effect on Poverty Reduction
Secure and tradable water rights reduce poverty in several ways. First, diey
allow scarce resources to be redeployed for more productive purposes, dius
leading to increased output and employment. This occurred, for example, when
farmers in Chile and Mexico sold dieir water rights to more productive farmers
or cities. Second, tradable water rights encourage new investment in activities
that require large quantities of water. An investment in a fruit farm is more
likely to be attractive if die investor knows that water will not be transferred to
a neighboring city in times or scarcity and diat additional water can be pur-
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chased from farmers during water shortages. In Mexico investors built a water-
bottling plant after negotiating for the water rights from a farmer. Not only was
the farmer better off, but the increased investment also generated additional
employment. A World Bank (1994) study on Peru found diat tradable water
rights have the potential to increase private investment in hydraulic infrastruc-
ture, freeing up public resources for other activities while allowing rapid and
cost-effective development of hydraulic projects.
Third, by empowering user groups to have a say on the issuance or transfer
of water rights, secure and tradable rights help protect die poor. When water
rights are granted widiout charge by public authorities, it is typically the rich
and politically influential who have easier access to them, often at the expense
of the poor. This is the case, for example, in Peru. Fourth, secure and trad-
able water rights increase the value of the rights, which are often the most
precious assets of poor farmers. In Mexico many small farmers were able to
take advantage of their ability to sell their water rights while still remaining
on the land.
Additionally, by making it easier for cities to obtain water, such markets
benefit the poor because they are the most likely urban residents to have been
excluded from piped service. Chile provides almost universal coverage of piped
water in urban areas. A contributing factor to that extensive coverage is the
ability of water companies to obtain "raw" water at a reasonable price (as in
Arica and La Serena). In cities such as lima or Karachi, where municipal water
availability is often limited to certain hours of the day, improved availability of
raw water would allow households to receive water at any time. Finally, because
the transfer of water to higher-value uses occurs without confiscating water
from less productive users (farmers) and without having to build new infra-
structure, it is cheaper and fairer than alternatives, such as raising water charges
substantially.
No one has measured the effect of tradable water rights on economic growth
in Chile and Mexico. Anecdotal evidence and studies showing the gains from
trading water suggest, however, that water rights have facilitated economic
growth. Agriculture in Chile grew 6 percent a year in the decade following the
passage of the water law. In Mexico more efficient farmers were able to expand
their output substantially by buying surface water rights. Similarly, die pur-
chase of groundwater rights made it possible for industry to expand production
and employment. Widiout the opportunity to sell water rights legally, the ad-
justments following the peso's drop in December 1994, which led to changes
in relative prices and a decline in domestic demand, would have been more
difficult
In principle, inadequately regulated water sales could lead to erosion from
deserted land or threaten the environment if minimum flows at the lower sec-
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tions of rivers are not maintained. In practice, neither the author nor Hearne
and Easter (1997) found any evidence of such problems in Chile, mainly be-
cause Chilean farmers rarely sold all their water rights, because rivers in Chile
are short, with little return flow, and because some water users' associations
forbid trades that could reduce the availability of water downstream. In both
Chile and Mexico, trades require the approval of die pertinent users' associa-
tion as well as the public water authorities. Although Chile's water authorities
recently reported instances of environmental degradation caused by water sales,
such transactions do not appear to have caused serious problems. In fact, by
inducing conservation, water markets have postponed the need to build new
infrastructure, such as die proposed dam near La Serena in Chile, diereby averting
potential environmental problems.
When to Establish Tradable Water Rights
If water markets have all these advantages and have worked well for several
years in Chile, why have most other countries not adopted them?4 There are
many possible reasons, die relative importance of which varies.
• Some countries, for cultural or religious reasons, object to the idea that life-
sustaining water should be bought and sold.
• Some fear that rich individuals or companies will buy up all the rights,
excluding die poor from access to water and raising equity and monopoly
concerns.
• Another concern is that small-scale farmers, either in desperation or
ignorance, will sell their rights for a pittance and lose their livelihood.
• Some maintain that water transfers will damage the environment by
depleting aquifers, increasing water pollution, or changing ecosystems.
• In some cases, die few that stand to gain from the current system may
effectively oppose changing it.
• And because water use often has social benefits that exceed private ones,
there may be a sense that public control of water is necessary to ensure
adequate investment and low prices.
• The final reason relates to the costs stemming from setting up a new legal,
regulatory, and institutional framework; from defining, measuring, and
enforcing water rights; and from making necessary changes in water intake
and in the conveyance infrastructure to effect the transfers. Closely related to
these costs are the difficulties of implementing the initial allocation of water
rights, of ensuring that sales of water by one user do not afreet the water rights
of others (the return flow problem), and of establishing or strengthening
public and private institutions to permit a well-functioning market. Given
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diese costs, the potential benefits from trading water must be sufficiently large
for governments to consider establishing tradable water rights.
These problems, however, are not unique to tradable water rights; even pub-
licly administered systems of water allocation must cope widi diem. Water
rights are difficult to define, measure, and enforce even when diey are not
tradable, and institutional arrangements are essential to manage allocation and
distribution. Akhough water markets may require more complex infrastruc-
ture, delivery systems to transfer water are needed regardless of die method that
is used to reallocate die water. And most publicly administered systems of water
rights have not protected die poor. Efforts to keep water charges low have often
resulted in poor service and excluded low-income residents even while better-
off farmers and wealdiier urban residents obtained water at highly subsidized
prices. Although water markets can lead to monopolies, experience shows that
suitable antitrust and tariff legislation often results in lower prices and a higher
level of service compared widi government management of the resource. Simi-
larly, where social benefits exceed private benefits, a subsidy may be preferable
to government ownership and control.
Formal water markets tend to reduce die extent of die water problems facing
countries. For example, by increasing die implicit value of water rights and by
empowering users, water markets provide better incentives to define, measure,
and enforce rights to water, and diey strengthen private institutions such as
water users' associations. The infrastructure needed to implement die transfers
is likely to be less expensive if it is undertaken by die users than by public
authorities. Moreover, die users will build die infrastructure only when it is
economical to do so. Government provision is often hampered by die demands
of vested interest groups that promote cosdy projects, such as dams, tunnels,
and other infrastructure, even when die benefits provided by such services are
well below the costs of construction.
Before governments consider establishing a costly new legal and institutional
framework, certain minimum conditions must be met. First, because of die
costs of identifying potential trades and of making, recording, and enforcing
changes in water intakes and conveyance infrastructure, water must be quite
scarce—and therefore of high value. Additionally, die infrastructure must be
flexible enough to allow trades (for example, adjustable gates radier than fixed-
flow dividers). Second, society must be willing to enact legislation diat respects
private property rights to water and recognizes such rights for a reasonably long
period. Where cultural, constitutional, or religious factors preclude diis com-
mitment, effective formal markets are unlikely to develop or to stimulate pri-
vate investment and improved water use.5 Third, minimum institutional ca-
pacity in die public and private sector must exist or be developed before tradable
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water rights can be established. Private institutions such as user associations
that operate at the level of a ditch, canal, or river basin are needed to help
establish the initial allocation of water rights and to operate the system. Public
institutions must establish the legal and regulatory framework to register the
rights, to operate parts of die system diat users cannot, and to setde disputes
diat cannot be resolved by user associations. Finally, because of die likely oppo-
sition from diose widi a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, die po-
litical leadership must be prepared to widistand die opposition. If these condi-
tions are met for a substantial part of die country, governments should consider
legislation establishing tradable water rights.
Introducing Tradable Water Rights
Even when policymakers are convinced of die advantages of tradable water
rights, diey need to address several issues to ensure a successful outcome. In
addition diey must be strongly committed and patient. Water allocation is an
emotional subject and because of die technical and legal issues involved, die
process of changing to a new regime may take several years.6 Although die
design and implementation of tradable water rights need to be tailored to spe-
cific country circumstances, die following guidelines, which build upon Chile's
successes but avoid its mistakes, may be useful.
Conducting an Information Campaign
Experience shows diat it is essential to explain to users and odier affected groups die
advantages of formal property rights to water. A well-designed information cam-
paign can overcome die opposition to reform by powerful vested interests. The
mechanics of trading could be explained by railing on die expertise of representa-
tives from user associations in countries diat have successfully introduced formal
water markets. Users and other stakeholders can be invited to participate in design-
ing and implementing me legal framework. Discussions and analyses of draft ver-
sions of the law demonstrate a willingness to accommodate die concerns of farmers
and other users and are essential to successful implementation.
Registering Rights without Charge
The best way to ensure support for die law is to assign rights to users, widiout
charge, based on their historic usage. Aldiough diis approach may provide a
windfall gain to some farmers, it acknowledges diat die land price already re-
flects access to water at low prices and diat die government is unlikely to re-
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cover directly the capital costs of investment in infrastructure. Because this
procedure also rewards users that are taking more than their fair share of water,
there may be merit in trying to rectify some of the most egregious wrongs. If
the government were to try to use this opportunity to correct all such mistakes
or to confiscate all illegally obtained rights, however, chances are good that the
legislation will fail and the injustices will continue.
Once the rules are established, the individual registration process should be
coordinated by water users' associations using "block-tiding" methods, where
the government provides titles simultaneously to all users in a geographic area
(Holden and Thobani 1995). The establishment of a registry, whose officials
are perceived to be honest and who are given an adequate budget, is a high
priority. One way to ensure fiscal autonomy is to impose a small registration
charge to cover operational expenses. The public media should be used exten-
sively to enhance compliance with registration and to make sure that farmers
are fully aware of the consequences of their failure to register or to sell their
rights. Where large quantities of water are allocated for hydropower, the gov-
ernment should ensure that the initial assignment of such rights does not affect
the historical supply available for downstream users. This may require specify-
ing the minimum volume of water that will be released each week (box 1).
Auctioning New Rights
New and unallocated water rights should be sold at auction in an open and
transparent manner, making active use of the public media. Before any auction,
the government should establish a minimum reservation price and verify that
the water is not being used and is not needed for environmental or recreational
purposes. Information on prices and volumes of past auctions and on transac-
tions in the area should be made public. Any costs to enter the auction should
be kept as low as possible.
Protecting the Rights of Third Parties
Even if the initial allocation procedure protects existing users, subsequent sales
could infringe upon the water rights of third parties—the return flow problem
described earlier. In countries where the reuse of such flows is substantial, pro-
cedures to protect third parties must be instituted before trades are authorized.
One way to do this would be to specify that all water rights have both a con-
sumptive and a nonconsumptive element. While die former can be sold with-
out restriction, supplies for hydropower use can be sold only if die distribution
does not deprive odier users of water. Thus for most transfers within the same
water basin for the same use, owners would be free to sell 100 percent of their
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Box 1. Chile's Misunderstood Water Problems
Despite its success in improving water use, Chile still suffers from conflicts between hydropower
companies and farmers, from water quality problems, and from anticompetitive behavior in
electricity generation.
Farmer-Hydropower Conflicts. The problem developed when die privatized hydropower companies
were granted water rights that failed to set out their obligation to release specified volumes from the
reservoirs when farmers need diem. The problem was exacerbated when die companies requested
additional water for nonconsumption uses from rivers where consumption rights had not yet been
assigned (Riot and Quiroz 1995). This experience underscores me need to specify weekly releases of
nonconsumption rights—whether the rights are tradable or not is irrelevant.
Water Quality. These problems reflect Chile's failure to enact regulations to enforce die high
standards set in die environmental law. The security or tradability of the rights is not an issue.
Anticompetitive Behavior. Although not directly related to water markets, a shortcoming in
Chile's water code has allowed one power company to obtain nonconsumption rights to most
rivers, in a bid to keep out competition. Moreover, the company did not have to pay for these
rights because die auction operates under rules that grant die rights to die petitioner without
charge if no other parties approach. By establishing a minimum reservation price, by taxing
holdings of water rights (analogous to land taxes), and by passing appropriate antitrust legislation,
governments can prevent die abuse of monopoly power.
water rights. But if a farmer were to sell his rights to a water company whose
return flows do not return to the same aquifer or river, he could sell only that
amount which did not return to die aquifer or river.
Because of die technical difficulties in calculating die return flow compo-
nent on a case-by-case basis, diis approach may not be appropriate for develop-
ing countries. But it may be possible to calculate averages that specify die vol-
ume of water consumed by a certain crop or activity. In diose cases in which
return flows are an issue, diis published volume would become die limit on die
amount diat owners could sell to buyers (Holden and Thobani 1995). This
procedure would work for bodi surface water and groundwater. Even diough
die system has shortcomings, it would be a vast improvement over prohibiting
all transfers or having no controls, as is die case with informal water markets.
In addition to these hydrologic effects, there may be other important diird-party
economic effects. It is neither feasible nor desirable to protect against all of these
effects, but two points warrant attention. First, when sales of water from one canal
system to anodier result in a loss of water tariff income to a water user association,
it may be desirable to compensate the association for some of that lost income. For
instance, in die La Lagunera region of Mexico, buyers must pay 70 percent of die
water tariff to the original association and 30 percent to the new association. Sec-
ond, where municipalities lose significant revenues when water rights are trans-
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ferred to other regions, arrangements can be made to pay property taxes on these
rights to the original municipality; alternatively, an exit lump-sum tax may be worth
considering. This is an important issue in some western states of the United States
where rural municipalities lose their revenue base when irrigation water is trans-
ferred to cities.
Addressing Monopolies through Taxes and Legislation
Because of the large number of owners of water rights and the high prices
they will demand to sell those rights, a monopolistic structure in consump-
tive water rights (agriculture, industry, and so forth) is unlikely—with two
exceptions. First, a monopoly could occur when governments auction new
water rights, as happened in Chile (box 1). An appropriate minimum reserva-
tion price in auctions should help protect against this outcome. This arrange-
ment could be accompanied by taxes on both consumptive and
nonconsumptive rights. A tax on the rights, and not on the purpose for which
the water is used or the quantity of water used, has desirable characteristics
similar to those of land taxes: it does not distort production decisions, and it
helps recover public investment costs in infrastructure. The level of the tax
could, at a minimum, be set at the difference in land taxes between irrigated
and unirrigated land. For reasons of equity and administrative efficiency,
small holdings of water rights should be exempt from this tax. Second, mo-
nopolies could occur when awarding large volumes of new water rights in the
process of privatizing public hydraulic projects under construction. To pro-
tect against this risk, an appropriate regulatory framework for each hydraulic
project being privatized should be developed (World Bank 1994). In addi-
tion antitrust legislation could help protect against any possible monopolies
arising from the auction of new water rights, such as in the granting of
nonconsumptive rights for hydropower generation.
Water Pollution and Aquifer Depletion
Water quality standards or their enforcement need not be changed when estab-
lishing tradable'water rights. If the standards need revision or enforcement
needs to be improved, such measures can be introduced independently. But
water markets could exacerbate aquifer depletion because they provide an addi-
tional incentive to pump more water from the ground. Formal water markets
provide a feasible way to protect against aquifer depletion, because the law
would require that groundwater rights be registered. In regions where aquifer
depletion is a concern, groundwater users could form an association that would
work with government officials to monitor the level of the water table and each
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others' use. If the aquifer were not recharging adequately, the user association
would decrease the extraction limits of its users proportionately. Moreover, if
exploitation by a user resulted in a shortage of water available to others who are
legally entitled to it, public authorities could establish proportional reductions
in volumetric rights and bar new exploitation. Such a system is preferable to
most existing regimes, whereby owners of the land above an aquifer have full
rights to its water, even if dieir use results in its depletion.
Conclusion
Publicly owned water allocation systems have recorded costly inefficiencies in
the supply and use of water. Even in water-scarce areas, water is wasted and
public hydraulic projects are poorly conceived, implemented, and operated.
Moreover, public approaches have failed to protect the environment or to make
water accessible to the poor. With increasing populations and budgetary pres-
sures, these water systems are likely to become even more untenable.
Informal water markets, which evolve spontaneously, are politically easy to
implement and can lead to improved water use. But, because they are illegal
and thus unregulated, they often result in problems. Formal water markets have
greater potential for success.
Economic principles and lessons from experience suggest that formal enact-
ment of tradable water rights permits rapid and voluntary changes in water
allocation in response to changing demands, thereby improving water use. These
formal water markets also increase user participation in allocating water and
planning new investments, while allowing businesses to invest in activities that
require assured access to water. The resulting increase in employment and in-
come generation can help reduce poverty.
But tradable water rights are not a panacea, and an effective system is not
easy to introduce. Chile's experience and the demonstrated superiority of mar-
kets over publicly administered means of resource allocation in general suggest
that markets are preferable when water is scarce, when the infrastructure to
effect transfers exists or can be cheaply developed, when there is a minimum
institutional capacity to implement trades, and when there is political will to
establish appropriate legislation.
Notes
Matccn Thobani 15 senior economist in the World Bank's Latin America and Caribbean
Region. The author would like to acknowledge the useful comments of Lorena Alcazar, Ariel
Dinar, K. William Easter, Karin Kemper, Larry Simpson, and Ashok Subramanian.
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1. Note that a policy of pricing water to cover the full cost of building and managing the
infrastructure (the long-run marginal cost) is not optimal if the infrastructure is ill-con-
ceived and built at high cost. In die unlikely event that full cost pricing could be enforced,
most irrigators, who typically account for the bulk of water use, would be unable to afford
water and would be forced to give up farming. Most of the water would therefore go unused.
2. It is useful to HigrippiigK between the water charge paid by a user for system operation
and maintenance and the price paid to a seller to use a given volume of water or to lease a
certain volume of water for a given period. To draw an analogy from the condominium mar-
ket, the former is the condominium fee, while the latter is the fee paid for renting the condo-
minium from its owner.
3. The registration process is costly, however, it requires posting announcements in major
newspapers, so most small farmers do not actually register their rights. Nonetheless, these
rights continue to be honored, but the farmers are unable to sell their rights independently of
their land.
4. Because of the limifrrl sales of such rights as well as serious water-related problems, some
observers question this statement. In fact, although few trades occur in the high rainfall south-
ern regions and in canals that use fixed flow dividers, many beneficial sales and leases of water
are made in the water-scarce north. Also, Chile's water problems are largely unrelated to water
markets (see box 1).
5. Mexico chose to get around the constitution by calling water rights long-term conces-
sions but treating diem as if diey were property rights for land.
6. In Peru, despite more dian diree yean of debate and technical assistance, passage of a law
establishing tradable water rights is still uncertain.
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